Fake SI-policy invitations targeted US experts’ Microsoft logins

Proofpoint linked the campaigns, chiefly in July 2026, to a group it describes as China-aligned. The phishing pages could intercept passwords and tokens that keep users signed in.

Proofpoint linked the campaigns, chiefly in July 2026, to a group it describes as China-aligned. The phishing pages could intercept passwords and tokens that keep users signed in.
Phishing campaigns used fake SI-policy invitations to target experts at US universities, think tanks and law firms, chiefly in July 2026, according to Proofpoint. The messages were designed to steer recipients toward Microsoft cloud-login traps capable of capturing passwords and tokens that keep users signed in.
The Register reported on October 1 that Proofpoint attributed the suspected espionage activity to TA419, a group the researchers describe as China-aligned. The reported findings describe phishing attempts and the tools used; they do not confirm that any target’s account was successfully compromised.
Beginning July 8, the emails impersonated Lynne Edwards Parker, a former principal deputy director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and then economist and foreign-policy expert Heidi Crebo-Rediker. The messages invited recipients to join a fake SI-policy advisory committee or contribute to a purported Senate foreign relations committee report on superintelligence (SI) export controls and supply chains.
When a recipient replied, the attackers sent a shortened web link supposedly offering more details. It instead led to an attacker-controlled page with a fake OneDrive loading screen and a Cloudflare Turnstile check. The page then redirected the recipient to a credential-phishing page targeting Microsoft 365 and Entra ID, Microsoft’s cloud identity service.
The report also described a February attempt against an SI-policy analyst at a US think tank. That email impersonated a senior Anthropic employee and used the subject line “Request for Feedback on Military Integration of Claude.”
The reported kit could intercept usernames, passwords and Microsoft 365 session cookies. A session cookie is a token that lets a website recognize an already signed-in user. The attack uses an attacker-in-the-middle approach: the attacker relays traffic between the user and the genuine service while intercepting information passing between them.
As The Register explained in its 2022 coverage of reverse-proxy phishing, this approach can display genuine login-page content while the attacker intercepts the traffic. A stolen valid session cookie can let an attacker reuse an authenticated session without repeating the password and two-factor check—the second proof of identity required at login.
For organizations within the scope of TA419’s activity, Proofpoint recommends considering phishing-resistant, origin-bound authentication such as passkeys. “Origin-bound” means the authentication is tied to the genuine website’s address, addressing the risk of a user being asked to sign in through an attacker’s site.

OpenAI stands by the dismissals and says contracts with outside safety assessors are being finalised. The researchers allege retaliation, which the company denies.
4 min

IMPEL and IMPF want songs generally valued at least as highly as recordings, with payments and disclosure covering past use, SI training and generated music.

City police claimed five cameras, while the owners of seven cameras remain publicly unidentified. The county says it will not investigate ownership, citing limited resources.
4 min