RUSI urges common EU checks on infrastructure suppliers


Uneven adoption of voluntary 5G safeguards has left countries taking different approaches. Proposed binding restrictions could require equipment replacement across 18 critical sectors.
The UK-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is calling for a common EU framework to assess infrastructure suppliers, arguing that countries take different approaches to risks from Chinese technology. Its October 1 report, covered by The Register, recommends stronger EU powers while preserving members’ authority over national security and allowing for different risks in different sectors.
The practical stakes extend beyond choosing suppliers for new contracts. Pending European Commission proposals could require countries to remove and replace equipment already used in critical infrastructure. RUSI argues that decisions need to account for both security threats and the economic dependence that procurement can create.

The Register’s account of RUSI’s comparison describes Germany as historically prioritizing valuable trade ties with China over reducing supply-chain risk. Spain has often favored cost-effective procurement and has less pronounced China-related security concerns than the UK or US. Higher prices from some alternative suppliers have also reduced Spain’s appetite for replacing equipment.
Those choices have left substantial amounts of Chinese equipment in use. The account puts Chinese suppliers’ estimated share of Germany’s 5G radio access network—the equipment that connects devices to the mobile network—at 59 percent in 2024. The corresponding estimate for Spain was 32 percent.
RUSI says some Chinese vendors offer more capable products at lower prices than EU or US alternatives, making extra spending on non-Chinese equipment hard for some countries to justify. But the think tank warns that reliance on those products can create unwanted dependencies and give China influence over crucial supply chains. It cites China’s 2019 warning of economic “consequences” for Germany during the debate over 5G suppliers as an example of pressure linked to those ties.
Analysis
RUSI calls concerns about Chinese IT vendors “well-founded,” citing authorities’ powers to demand company data. It also points to rules requiring technology companies to report newly discovered security vulnerabilities to the Chinese government within 48 hours while withholding the same disclosure from overseas counterparts, except the product vendor. RUSI argues that this gives Chinese intelligence services privileged early access to flaws they could exploit.
Supplier restrictions address a different problem from the technical weaknesses that let attackers enter systems. The Register explains that banning companies or countries would not itself repair those weaknesses: software from suppliers in countries considered trusted can also remain vulnerable to attack. A common framework could guide supplier choices, but excluding designated vendors would not make the remaining equipment immune to intrusion.
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Correction ·
Corrected spelling and punctuation in the Armenian text.