Google says registry hijacks enabled unauthorized TLS certificates

In an October 7 log review, The Hacker News found 12 certificates for seven Google and YouTube domains, all recorded as revoked.

In an October 7 log review, The Hacker News found 12 certificates for seven Google and YouTube domains, all recorded as revoked.
Attackers compromised three country-code domain registries and used their control to obtain unauthorized certificates for several Google domains and other organizations, Google reported on October 6. The Hacker News reported on October 7 that it had identified 12 certificates for seven Google and YouTube domains, all shown as revoked in certificate-monitoring records.
The hijacks affected the domain endings .gh for Ghana, .sl for Sierra Leone and .as for American Samoa. Google said any domain under those endings was potentially at risk—not that every domain had been attacked. The company learned of the hijacks the week before its October 6 announcement. The compromise affected the third-party registries, not the domain owners’ infrastructure, and Google said it had no reason to believe the certificate authorities—the organizations that issue certificates—had done anything wrong.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates are digital credentials that authenticate websites, mail servers and other internet services and support encrypted connections. A certificate binds a domain name to a public cryptographic key. An unauthorized certificate can allow an attacker to impersonate the affected service.
The Domain Name System, or DNS, provides address information for internet services. Ars Technica reported that the attackers changed authoritative DNS records and nameserver delegations for selected domains: the records that supply a domain’s DNS answers and identify the servers responsible for them. This let the attackers pass automated domain-control validation checks, which require a certificate applicant to demonstrate control of a domain.
Certificate Transparency logs are public records of certificate issuance. The Hacker News examined them through the search services ctlogs.dev and Cert Spotter on October 7. It found 12 domain-validated certificates—issued after a check of the applicant’s control—for seven Google and YouTube domains. Eleven came from Let’s Encrypt and one from ZeroSSL. They were first logged between September 22 and 27.
| Domain ending | Issuer | Certificates | First logged | Revoked |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| .gh | Let’s Encrypt | 2 | September 22 | September 26 |
| .sl | Let’s Encrypt | 5 | September 25 | October 1 |
| .sl | ZeroSSL | 1 | September 25 | September 26 |
| .as | Let’s Encrypt | 4 | September 27 | October 1 |
Cert Spotter’s records showed all 12 as revoked on October 7, The Hacker News reported. The outlet also quoted Matthew McPherrin, a Let’s Encrypt staff member, confirming on the authority’s community forum that day that certificates for Google and YouTube had been issued and revoked.
The gaps between the certificates’ first log entries and revocation ranged from roughly a day and a half to nearly a week. These intervals do not establish whether or when attackers used the certificates. Only a small selection of Google and YouTube names was searched, so 12 is not an established total for the attacks.
Google said it first blocked unauthorized certificates for its properties in Chrome through CRLSets, its emergency certificate-blocking mechanism. It also worked with the issuing authorities to revoke them, extending protection to software other than Chrome. Certificate Transparency data then revealed certificates for other organizations believed to be affected, including major brands and widely used online services. Google blocked those certificates in Chrome too and alerted the organizations where possible.
Google says Chrome users do not need to take action to receive its protection. But the company cannot guarantee that it identified every affected domain, and Chrome’s blocking does not reliably protect people using other software. Google has not named the affected domains or other organizations; the log examination identifies some Google and YouTube names independently. The total number of unauthorized certificates and complete protection outside Chrome remain unclear.
Google has not said whether the certificates were used to impersonate its sites or read users’ data. It has also not identified the attackers, explained how the registries were compromised or said whether the registries have been secured.
Google advises domain owners not to rely solely on browser blocking. It recommends monitoring Certificate Transparency logs across every domain, including unused and regional names. These public records disclose every certificate trusted by default in Chrome and can provide near-real-time alerts to unexpected issuance. Owners of .gh, .sl and .as domains should review recent entries.
Google also recommends restrictive Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) records. These DNS records name the authorities permitted to issue certificates for a domain, and an authority must check them before issuing. Google recommends further restrictions to authorized accounts and validation methods; account restrictions require support from the issuing authority.
CAA cannot prevent issuance during an active DNS hijack because an attacker controlling DNS can remove or replace the record. Its role becomes important after the owner regains control. Certificate authorities may store and reuse successful domain-control checks, allowing an attacker validated during the hijack to request more certificates afterward. Google says restoring a restrictive CAA policy prevents attackers from using that stored validation to obtain further certificates.
The Hacker News reported that all seven identified domains had restrictive CAA records on October 7. Google Public DNS returned records naming only pki.goog, the domain of Google Trust Services, as the permitted issuer. That observation does not establish whether the compromised registries have been secured.
Domain owners can also report an unexpected certificate to the authority that issued it. Under the rules certificate authorities follow, anyone can file a Certificate Problem Report, and the authority must investigate and report its first findings within 24 hours, The Hacker News reported. Google also said it would continue work on longer-term protections, including shorter certificate validity periods and reduced reuse of domain-control validation checks.

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