Tester says unpatched Windows exposed law-firm systems

Joe Brinkley recounts reaching 2,500 computers several years ago despite remediation spending he estimated at about $500,000. Readable passwords compounded the problem.

Joe Brinkley recounts reaching 2,500 computers several years ago despite remediation spending he estimated at about $500,000. Readable passwords compounded the problem.
A law firm’s spending on security software did not stop Joe Brinkley from entering its Windows systems through an unpatched vulnerability, according to his account in The Register. Once inside, he said, he found passwords stored in readable form. The account describes an authorized security test several years ago, not a newly discovered breach.
Brinkley, whom the report identifies as Cobalt’s director of offensive security research and community, said a large national law firm commissioned the penetration test while preparing to acquire a smaller business. A penetration test is an authorized attempt to find weaknesses by trying to enter an organization’s systems. He had audited the law firm the previous year and identified security gaps.
The firm subsequently spent time and money on security software, The Register reported. Brinkley estimated the remediation spending at “probably a half a million dollars,” yet said he reached 2,500 of the organization’s computers. These are his retrospective figures. The report, published on October 1, 2026, names neither the firm nor the test date and provides no independent corroboration of his account.
According to the account, the Windows machines remained unpatched against BlueKeep despite that investment. BlueKeep is a remote-code-execution vulnerability: it allows an attacker to enter an affected computer and run code remotely. It involves Windows’ Remote Desktop Protocol, which supports remote connections to computers, and affects older systems including Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2.
The Register reports that BlueKeep was discovered, patched and exploited in 2019. Brinkley said he used that vulnerability to gain access. In this account, the initial opening was therefore a software flaw left unfixed, rather than a password he had guessed.
Analysis
After gaining access, Brinkley said he found passwords stored in plaintext—readable text rather than encrypted data. He could export them to a file without decrypting them. That exposed the credentials regardless of how complicated their spelling looked.
One exposed password belonged to the firm’s chief information security officer, according to the account. It was “r3@lg00dp@$$w0rd,” a version of “realgoodpassword” with numbers and symbols substituted for letters. Brinkley obtained the stored password; the substitutions did not prevent that exposure.
The Register suggested that two-factor authentication—requiring a second identity check as well as a password—and encrypting the passwords “would probably have helped.” These measures address different problems: authentication controls check who can log in, protected storage limits password exposure, and patching fixes the software flaw Brinkley said he used to enter. Cosmetic changes to a password do not perform those jobs.

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